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A STUDY OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 2003:
CAN TORT REFORM BENEFIT ARKANSAS?

By Scott Jackson
Department of Finance
Advisor: Dr. John M. Norwood
Department of Accounting

Abstract:

The Growing Debate:

Without question, reforming America's civil justice system
has become a hot button issue in today's political landscape.
While most Americans move about their daily lives without
giving the subject a second thought, politicians ranging from
aspiring state assemblymen to the recently reelected George W
Bush have placed tort reform at the forefront of American
political affairs. Although problems plaguing American courts
have been discussed for years, criticism of America's current
system for adjudicating tort cases has reached a fever pitch.
Among the more vocal critics are poweifullobbyist groups, such
as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American
Tort Reform Association (ATRA), who believe the current civil
justice system is responsible for increases in liability insurance,
a decrease in the quality of health care, and an overall increase
in the cost of doing business. Opposing groups, such as the
Association ofTrial Lawyers ofAmerica (ATIA}, believe it is the
right ofeve!'}' American consumer to have their day in court and
punish corporations and doctors for committing civil offenses
against them. And sandwiched in the middle ofthis fiasco are the
thousands of politicians, businessmen, doctors, and ordinary
citizens who are left scratching their heads when they tl'}' and
figure it all out.

By now most Americans have at least heard of the
McDonald's hot coffee case. The case involved Stella Liebeck
of Albuquerque, New Mexico suing her local McDonald's fast
food restaurant when she spilled hot coffee on herself after
making the purchase at the drive-through window. Liebeck was
awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million,
two days of McDonald's coffee sales, in punitive damages. The
award for punitive damages was later reduced by the trial court
judge to $480,000 (iCan2000, n.d.)l. Both sides appealed, but
before the appellate court could rule on the matter, the case was
settled. This case can serve almost single-handedly as the
measuring stick with which to gauge whether or not one is for or
against tort reform. Many Americans will see the headlines in
the paper, "Woman Awarded $2.7 Million for Spilling Coffee,"
and make the judgment that the courts are out of control in
awarding millions in what can only be described as frivolous
lawsuits. Others will say that Liebeck received adequate
compensation from a negligent business that was serving coffee
at around 185 degrees with no warning as to how hot the coffee
really was. They would also point out that this case shows that
the current system provides a mechanism to reduce unusually
large jury awards. Thus, in this example, one may begin to see
the makings of the current tort reform debate that has grabbed the
attention of both the federal and state governments.

This paper attempts to explain the debate surrounding tort
reform on both the national and state levels. Further, it
summarizes each section of Arkansas Act 649 of 2003, better
known as the Civil Justice Reform Act of2003 (the "Act"), and
point to any obvious benefits to the business community as a
result ofthe reforms. A more challenging topic this paper covers
is whether or not tort reform, specifically the Act, will provide
future economic benefits to the state of Arkansas. This paper
attempts to make the direct link beMeen legal reforms and
increases in economic output as measured by personal income
levels. The model is intended to be VCI'}' simplistic yet still
provide a picture of how tort reform may or may not benefit
Arkansas' economy in the future.
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On the federal level, the debate has led to many failed
attempts by Congress to pass measures involving the limitation
of medical liability, class action status, punitive damages, or any
other civil justice reform. Although proponents of tort reform
have a tremendous amount of support in the Republican Congress.
Senate Republicans have yet to gamer enough votes to stop the
Democrats' filibuster on all things related to reform. Tort reform
proponents were able to score a victory earlier this year regarding
class action lawsuits, with the passage of the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA). However, on most of the major reform
issues, tort law reformers have failed to win any major battles on
Capitol Hill.
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Backed by the ATLA, opponents of reform have plenty of
firepower to win the support of key congressional leaders and
fight off pushes to reform the system. ATLA CEO John Haber
states, "I don't agree [that business interests] have traction with
Joe Sixpack. Average Americans don't want a system that's
tilted so it works for the rich and powerful" (as cited in Dunham,
2005, p. 53). In general, there is a belief among tort reform
opponents that ordinary citizens are able to, in effect, police
companies and doctors through lawsuits involving torts. When
a business places a faulty product on the market that may cause
harm, or a doctor commits medical malpractice, reform opponents
believe it is the consumer that has a right to go after that business
or doctor and prevent such action from occurring again in the
future. According to the organization's mission statement,
ATLA is in place to "champion the cause of those who deserve
redress for injury to person or property," and to "promote the
public good through concerted efforts to secure safe products, a
safe workplace, a clean environment, and quality health care"
(ATLA Mission, 2005).
It is the notion of using the courts as an equalizer that
pushes some trial lawyers, such as Senator John Edwards (DNorth Carolina), into the consumer protection spotlight. Sen.
Edwards made a name for himself by representing clients who
were injured by the negligence of corporations and doctors.
With the attention turned to Sen. Edwards in the 2004 presidential
race, tort reform opponents seized the opportunity to publicly
state their opposition to limitations on the consumer's ability to
file suit with stories from Sen. Edwards' career as an attorney.
One case cited numerous times throughout the campaign involved
a five year old child named Valerie Lakey. Valerie, according to
Sen. Edwards' book Four Trials (2004), was disemboweled by
a faulty pool drain cover in 1993. The case made the Senator
famous when the jury awarded the Lakey's $25 million. Cases
such as the Lakey's are often cited by tort reform opponents to
show how the system successfully acts as the great equalizer
between victims of civil offenses and negligent parties.

Opponents of tort reform face an equally powerful group of
lobbyists looking to reform America's civil justice system.
Organizations such as the AMA, ATRA, and other groups
representing insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies,
health maintenance organizations, doctors, and hospitals are
fighting to win the war on tort reform. These organizations are
carved out of the belief that tort litigation has led to an increased
cost of doing business and a decrease in the quality of health care.
With President Bush back in office and a greater number of
Republicans in both the House and the Senate, reform proponents
believe they have gained new life in the tort reform debate.
President Bush stated in 2000,
From people across America, I am hearing that our
legal system needs reform. That our courts aren't
se.rving the people, they are serving the lawyers. That
fnvolous lawsuits are hurting people. Some think this
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special interest group is too powerful to take on. That
money determines everything. This is not an
argument; it is an excuse. This cause is not hopeless.
("George W. Bush on", 2000).
President Bush again pushed tort reform in the 2004
presidential campaign, and since his reelection has placed reform
near the top of his agenda (Dobbs, 2005).
One of the largest organizations fighting for reforming
America's civil justice system is the AMA. The organization
leads the way in pushing for legislation to limit the number and
severity of medical liability lawsuits. The AMA states, "The
crisis is threatening access to care for patients in states without
liability reforms" (American Medical Association, 2004a). The
organization encourages its membership to contact its respective
Senators and Representatives to promote passage of a
comprehensive liability reform package. To aid in the effort, the
AMA has released a "physician action kit" 2 providing information
and talking points on the subject of medical liability reform. The
organization also releases routinely cited information regarding
which states it considers to be crisis states when it comes to
medical liability. The current count stands at 20 crisis states and
24 states showing problem signs (American Medical Association,
2004b).
Leading the way for the business community is ATRA.
The organization claims to represent "more than 300 businesses,
corporations, municipalities, associations, and professional
firms," in its quest for a more fair civil justice system (American
Tort Reform Association, 2005a). The group cites 3M, Caterpillar,
Boeing, and Pfizer among its members. Even with all of this
support, A TRA has yet to persuade Congress to pass legislation
that would completely overhaul the way tort cases are carried out
in this country. Yet, ATRA fights on. President of ATRA
Sherman Joyce states,
Some astonishing decisions come out of the courts·
these days. Hundreds of millions in punitive damages
piled on top of relatively minor actual damages.
Meritless cases settled because defendants fear the
outcome of an emotion-filled jury trial or a lawless
court. That's why the American Tort Reform
Association (ATRA) leads the fight for a better civil
justice system- one that's fair, efficient and predictable
(American Tort Reform Association, 2005b).

The AMA and ATRA along with other organizations
continue to press Congress to pass comprehensive tort reforrri~
Without it, these organizations believe the American economy
will be negatively impacted for years to come. ·

Arkansas' Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003:
Arkansas' version of tort reform, the Civil Justice Reform .
Act of 2003, was signed into law by Governor Mike Huckabee -
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on March 25, 2003. The Act was passed by the Senate with a vote
of 34 to 1, while the House passed the bill 71 to 28.
The Act lays out many changes to the civil justice system
in Arkansas. According to an article published in The Arkansas
Lawyer, some of the more visible reforms include ( 1) modification
of joint and several liability, (2) limits to the amount awarded for
punitive damages, and (3) revisions of rules regarding medical
injury actions (Leflar, n.d.). While only these three major areas
of reform are discussed below, the Act also reforms many other
less visible yet still significant areas of Arkansas' tort system.
The following attempts to simplify the modifications set forth in
the Act. This discussion is designed to follow the organization
of the Act as it was passed by the legislature. It does not directly
follow the organization of the law as codified in Ark. Code Ann.
BB 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206, and 16-114-208 to -212.

Joint and Several Liability
The first section of the Act calls for the modification of
joint and several liability. According to this section,
In any action for personal injury, medical injury,

property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of
each defendant for compensatory orpunitive damages
shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each
defendant shall be liable only for the amount of
damages allocated to that defendant in direct
proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault,
and a separate several judgment shall be rendered
against that defendant for that amount (Arkansas
General Assembly, 2003, Section 1 (a)).
Prior to the Act, liability for damages in civil cases involving
multiple defendants was not divided between each defendant.
For example, assume two defendants were found negligent for
personal injury in a car accident and were ordered to pay $1
million in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant A
was responsible for 90 percent of the damages caused by the
accident, while Defendant B was responsible for only 10 percent
of the damages. If Defendant A was only able to pay $10,000 due
to insufficient funds, then Defendant B, regardless of his
percentage of fault, would be required to come up with the
remaining balance of $990,000 if he is solvent. In other words,
the amount paid in damages by each defendant is not directly
proportional to the percentage of fault.
Section One of the Act attempts to remove the inconsistency
that exist between the amount each defendant is ordered to pay
and his/her percentage of fault. Using the same example from
above, since Defendant A was responsible for 90 percent of the
damages, he must pay 90 percent of the award amount, or
$900,000. Defendant B would only be responsible for his
percentage of fault. In this example, he would pay 10 percent of
the damages, or $100,000, versus the more than $900,000 he
would pay in the previous example. This example holds true
unless one or more of the defendants is insolvent. If that is the
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case, the Act calls for a graduated increase in the percentage a
defendant must pay as described in Section Three of the Act,
discussed later in this paper. As a general overview of the new
joint and several liability provisions, however, the simplified
example above holds.
Section Two of the Act further details the procedures that
are to be used in assessing percentage of fault. Mainly, this
section deals with the liability of parties not directly named in the
suit. Under the Act, awards must be adjusted based on the
percentage of fault of such nonparties. If the defendant can show
a nonparty was liable for some of the damages, then the award
amount must take into consideration the proportion of damages
for which that person is responsible. According to The Arkansas
Lawyer,
These nonparties to whom fault could be assigned
might include out-of-state or foreign firms that cannot
be sued for lack of personal jurisdiction; persons or
entities protected by sovereign, charitable, or
intrafamily immunities; employers whose negligence
was one cause of injury to an employee suing a third
party such as a product manufacturer; persons or
entities without assets "not worth suing"; and persons
whose location and perhaps even identity is unknown
(Leflar, n.d.).
The Act specifies that fault of a nonparty can be considered
either if the plaintiff enters into a settlement with that particular
nonparty, or if the defendant can show that the nonparty was
either partially or wholly at fault. As laid out in Section Two, the
defense must file a pleading with the court stating the identity of
the nonparty along with why the defense believes that party to be
at fault in the particular matter. The pleadings regarding the
percentage of fault of persons not named in the suit must be filed
no later than 120 days prior to the date on which the trial is set to
begin. Importantly, the Act also states that if the fact finder
assesses fault to a nonparty based on a settlement with the
plaintiff or a pleading filed by the defense, the findings of fault
do not subject the nonparty to any liability with regards to current
matter.
Section Three of the Act also relates to joint and several
liability reforms. This section calls for graduated increases in the
percentage points a defendant is ordered to pay if it is determined
that other defendants found liable in the suit are not able to make·
full payment. In other words, if one defendant is insolvent, the
other defendants may have to cover some of the funds that were
to be provided by the insolvent defendant. In order to accomplish
this, the Act sets up three levels of liability where the defendant
determined to be the most responsible for the damages incurs
most of the burden, and the defendant that is least responsible for
the damages incurs the least amount of the burden. The first level
of liability involves those defendants whose percentage of fault
is no more than ten percent. If a defendant meets this criterion,
then that defendant shall not be subject to any increase in his
share of the damages owed. The second level of liability
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involves those defendants whose percentage of fault is greater
than ten percent but less than 50 percent. Defendants that fall into
this category may see their proportion of the damages owed
increase by up to ten percentage points if another defendant is
unable to make payment. The final level ofliability encompasses
defendants whose percentage of fault is determined to be 50
percent or greater. Defendants in this grouping may see an
increase of as much as twenty percentage points in their amount
of damages owed should another defendant become insolvent.
It is easy to see how Arkansas businesses will benefit from
refom1ing the joint and several liability rules that were in place
prior to passage of the Act. Under the new provisions, businesses
are able to limit their share of liability in certain situations. For
example, assume a customer of a small, locally owned retail
establishment is injured while taking an item off of a shelf. The
customer sues the retail business and is awarded $100,000 in
punitive and compensatory damages. Under the old law, the
business must pay the entire $100,000 in damages. Today, with
the new law in place, the business may be able to show that either
another named defendant or even a nonparty is partially to blame
for the accident. Continuing, assume the trier of fact determines
that the defendant was responsible for only 20 percent of the fault
while a nonparty was responsible for the other 80 percent, then
the business would only have to pay $20,000, or 20 percent of the
damages. As is the case with many small businesses in Arkansas,
the difference in paying $20,000 and paying $100,000 can be the
difference between staying in business and closing the doors for
good. Of course, this is only a simplified hypothetical situation,
but one can easily see that the changes made to joint and several
liability can greatly impact a business's bottom line.

Punitive Damages
The second major reform imposed by the Civil Justice
Reform Act of2003 pertains to punitive damages. According to
Black's Law Dictionary, punitive damages are "damages awarded
in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with
recklessness, malice, or deceit" (Gamer, 2001, p. 171). Section
Nine of the Act is the first section to deal with the subject. This
section states that if a court is to award punitive damages in a civil
case, the plaintiff must first show that the defendant is liable for
compensatory damages. Therefore, if a court rules in favor of the
defendant and awards no compensatory damages, the plaintiff
has no claim with regards to punitive damages. Beyond proving
liability for compensatory damages, the plaintiff must also meet
either of the following aspects as they relate to a particular case:
(1) That the defendant knew or ought to have known,
in light of the surrounding circumstances, that his or
her conduct would naturally and probably result in
injury or damage and that he or she continued the
conduct with malice or in reckless disregard of the
consequences from which malice may be inferred
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 9 (1)).
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(2) That the defendant intentionally pursued a course
of conduct for the purpose of causing injury or damage
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 9 (2)).

Providing the plaintiff can show that the defendant's actions
meet either one of the above criterion, the plaintiff may then
proceed to petition the court to award punitive damages, although
the Act states the plaintiff has no right to receive a punitive
damages award.
Section 11 of the Act pertains to one of the more controversial
and heavily debated reforms put into place by the Act. This
section limits the amount of punitive damages that may be
awarded in a civil case. According to the Act, punitive damages
awarded by a court must not exceed the greater of (1) $250,000
or (2) three times the amount awarded for compensatory damages
not to exceed $1,000,000. Further, Section 11 requires that every
three years beginning January I, 2006 the limits on punitive
damages set forth by the Act are to be adjusted for inflation in
accordance with the Consumer Price Index.
To illustrate the punitive damage caps imposed by the Act,
suppose, hypothetically, a consumer is severely injured by a
razor while shaving. The consumer meets with an attorney and
decides to pursue legal action against the maker of that particular
razor blade. Upon completion of the trial, the trier of fact
determines that the company was indeed liable for the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff, the consumer, and awards $20,000 in
compensatory damages to cover medical expenses. Now assume
the plaintiff can prove that the defendant knew of the defective
razors but chose not to act on this information. In light of this
information, the plaintiff may be awarded as much as $250,000
in punitive damages since, as stated in the Act, this amount is the
greater of the two punitive damage caps. If the plaintiff were
awarded compensatory damages totaling more than $83,333,
then the plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages in the
amount of three times compensatory damages but less than
$1,000,000. Again, this is only a hypothetical example and is
oversimplified to communicate the basic aspects of the Act.
Section 11 also allows for exceptional cases in which the
plaintiff may recover more than the amount specified by the
damage caps. The Act states,
When the fact finder determines by clear and
convincing evidence that, at the time of the injury, the
defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct
for the purpose of causing injury or damage and
determines that the defendant's conduct did, in fact,
harm the plaintiff, then (the caps stated previously)
shall not apply (Arkansas General Assembly, 2003,
Section 11 (b)).

Therefore, continuing with the example regarding razor
blades, if the plaintiff can show by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the manufacturer of the razor blades intentionally
sold defective razors in order to injure its customers, then the
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amount awarded to the plaintiff for punitive damages is not
subject to the restrictions detailed previously. It is important
here to define "clear and convincing evidence." That is, "evidence
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain" (Gamer, 2001, p. 250). This burden of proof
can be described as greater than a "preponderance of the evidence"
used in civil cases but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt"
used in criminal cases.
Another major reform concerning punitive damages is the
establishment of an option to request a bifurcated proceeding.
According to Section 14 of the Act, "In any case in which
punitive damages are sought, any party may request a bifurcated
proceeding at least ten days prior to trial" (Arkansas General
Assembly, 2003, Section 14 (a)). In other words, either party
may request that the trial be divided into two stages. In the first
stage, the trial would take place and the court would decide
whether or not compensatory damages are to be awarded. If
compensatory damages are awarded, then a second stage
commences in which the court rules as to whether or not punitive
damages are warranted and in what amount. Section 14 goes on
to state that it is only during the second stage of the trial, the stage
regarding punitive damages, that the financial condition of the
defendant be admissible.
Again, it is simple to see how the reforms regarding
punitive damages may positively affect businesses involved in
tort litigation. Prior to passage of the Act, a business may have
been required to pay thousands or sometimes millions of dollars
in punitive damages. Under the reforms laid out in the Act, the
amount a business may be required to pay in punitive damages
is reduced substantially provided the business did not intentionally
cause the injury. If a particular business caused unintentional
harm to the plaintiff and lost at trial, the most the defendant
would be obligated to pay in punitive damages would total
$1,000,000. Additionally, assuming compensatory damages
equaled $83,333 or less, punitive damages could not exceed
$250,000. Thus the savings to a business' bottom line can be
substantial due to the reforms imposed by the Act.

Medical Injury Reforms
Finally, as is the case with many of the tort reforms enacted
by states, the Act makes some significant changes to the
procedures and rules governing cases involving medical injuries.
The first of these reforms appears in Section 15 of the Act.
Overturning previous case law, this section eradicates the
collateral source rule. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, the
collateral source rule is "the doctrine that if an injured party
receives compensation for the injuries from a source independent
of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the
damages that the tortfeasor must pay" (Garner, 2001, p. 109).
Although the Act does not limit the amount that may be awarded
for compensatory damages, Section 15 does require that any
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payments made by an independent source to cover medical
expenses be subtracted from the damages awarded. Mainly,
Section 15 is designed to account for any money the plaintiff may
have received from an insurance provider. If the insurance
company already paid for all or part of the medical expenses, that
amount is deducted from the compensatory damages award.
Under the previous law, a medical care provider may have paid
for all of the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff because
of the provider's negligent actions, even if the plaintiff had
received reimbursement from an insurance provider. In essence,
the complaining party may have collected double the
compensation for his/her injuries. This is no longer the case
because of the provisions set forth in Section 15 the Act.
Section 18 ofthe Act establishes new procedures regarding
the use of expert witnesses. According to this section, if it is
determined that the negligent action for which the defendant is
charged is not "within the jury's comprehension as a matter of
common knowledge," the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
that the injuries caused by the defendant should not have occurred
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Sec. 18). This can be
accomplished through the testimony of an expert witness. The
plaintiff by means of the expert witness, who must be of the same
specialty as the defendant, must show that the defendant did not
act within what is considered standard practice for that specialty
and therefore caused the particular medical injury. The reason
for employing such a provision is two fold. First, the use of an
expert witness is designed to bridge the gap between what is
considered common knowledge and what can be highly technical,
medical terminology. Second, it prevents the plaintiff from
bringing in a "hired gun" to testify about a specialty in which he/
she is not trained (Leflar, n.d.). In this way, Section 18limits a
common measure used by plaintiffs in proving negligence on the
part of the defendant.
Section 20 of the Act also contains language pertaining to
medical injury cases. Although the reforms made by Section 20
appear subtle upon first glance (only 14 words were added to the
existing law), the changes can have a substantial impact on the
ability of the defendant to pay, and the plaintiff to receive, any
damages awarded by the court. Previously, Arkansas law stated,
"If the award for future damages exceeds $100,000 the court
may, at the request of either party, order that the future
damagesbbe paid in whole, or in part, by periodic payment"
(Arkansas Code, G I 6-114-209). The key alteration made by the
Act replaces the word "may" with "shall." Although this does
not seem significant, the repercussions are noteworthy. In the
past, the court had the ultimate say as to whether or not judgments
against the defendant were to be paid up front or in periodic
payments. Under the Act, the court is obligated to set periodic
payments for damage awards at the request of either party. The
financial benefit to medical providers is indeed substantial. For
example, a judgment against the defendant in the amount of
$500,000 could potentially render the defendant insolvent if a
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lump sum payment is required. If the defendant requests
periodic payment of the damages, the defendant may allocate
future payments into his/her financial situation. Thus, not only
is the defendant better able to recover from the loss incurred as
a result of the lawsuit, the plaintiff is more likely to receive
compensation for his/her injury.
Section 21 of the Act sets new rules regarding what is
termed, "False and unreasonable pleadings" in medical injury
actions (Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 21). This
section, in line with previous law, forces the complaining party
to pay for the costs, including attorney's fees, incurred by the
defendant as a direct result of the filing of the case. Although
previous state law required the same repayment for false and
unreasonable pleadings as a means to reduce the number of
unfounded claims, the Act goes one step further in allowing the
court to place sanctions deemed appropriate on the party or
attorney who filed the claim. The Act, however, does not specify
what sanctions are considered appropriate.
Section 21 also requires the plaintiff to submit an affidavit
signed by an expert showing reasonable cause for filing a
particular claim. The affidavit must state,
(A) The expert's familiarity with the applicable
standard of care in issue;
(B) The expert's qualification;
(C) The expert's opinion as to how the applicable
standard of care has been breached; and

(D) The expert's opinion as to how the breach of the
applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death
(Arkansas General Assembly, Section 21 (2)).

This affidavit must be filed within 30 days of the time the
complaint was originally filed, or the case will be dismissed by
the court before ever going to trial. Again, provisions such as this
were put into place to help curb the number of frivolous lawsuits
filed against medical care providers in Arkansas.
Section 22 lays out a number of reforms pertaining to
medical injury actions. First, this section seeks to limit the
liability exposure of medical care facilities (i.e. hospitals, nursing
homes, clinics, etcO). The limitation of exposure is accomplished
by placing the burden of proof on the complaining party in
proving that the medical care provider was indeed an employee
of the medical facility named as a codefendant. This provision
prevents plaintiffs from attempting to hold a medical facility
liable for injuries caused by a non-employee medical care
provider at that facility. For example, if a non-employee doctor
causes a medical injury while visiting a patient at a hospital, the
plaintiff may not bring suit against the hospital since the doctor
is not considered an employee of the facility.
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Section 22 also provides that surveys and inspections the
plaintiff"seeks to use as evidence against a medical care provider
must be relevant to the plaintiffs injury to be admissible at trial"
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 22). For instance,
if a plaintiff is suing a hospital in the death of the plaintiffs
newborn child, an inspection of the hospital's onsite pharmacy
conducted by the State Board of Pharmacy would most likely be
inadmissible. This of course assumes the pharmacy was in no
way linked to the death of the child. Interestingly, this element
of Section 22 applies only to the plaintiffs side of the case. If the
defendant wishes to submit surveys or inspection results
displaying the overall quality of the medical facility, the evidence
would not be deemed inadmissible under Section 22 of the Act.

The Economics of Tort Reform:
The final piece of this thesis is to measure the impact of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 on Arkansas' economy. With
the introduction of this legislation to the state legislature in 2003,
many argued that the reform package would bring economic
prosperity as insurance premiums went down and industry
flooded to the state. Indeed, it is still too soon to know the
savings, if any, that the reforms have actually brought to Arkansas'
businesses and citizens. However, using data collected from
other states that have enacted tort reform bills over the last
several decades, it is possible to project the savings to Arkansans
within the next few years.

Methodology
In order to study the impact of tort reform passed in early
2003 on Arkansas' economy, it is first necessary to study the
relationship between tort reform enacted in other states and the
impact on that state's economy. To accomplish this, I collected
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regarding each
state's per capita personal income (PPI) from 1969 to 2003.3 I
also collected data as to whether or not a state had enacted tort
reform and in what year(s) the reforms were passed. This data
was collected from the American Tort Reform Association. 4
This study defines tort reform as removal of traditional joint and
several liability from a state's civil procedure or as the capping
of punitive damages. By doing this, the model employed is able
to better compare two of the most basic reforms of the Civil
Justice Reform Act (joint and several liability reform and punitive
damage caps) to reforms passed in other states. The model
developed by the author, Dr. Jeff Collins5 , and Dr. Cary Deck6 is
as follows:
b. Y-= ~o + ~1X1 + ~2X2 +~3X3 +~4Xt + ~sXs + ~06 + ~1X1 + e

In this model, !:1 Y

represents the change in personal per

capita income (PPI) from year to year. ~ 0 is simply a constant,
or intercept term, representing the value of the change in PPI
when the X variables are zero. The variable X 1 represents the
previous year's PPI, as this is a likely determinant of next year's
PPI. The variable X 2 represents whether or not tort reform was

6
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enacted in that particular year. It is a dummy variable that
receives a value of zero if no reform occurred in that year and a
value of one if reform did occur. In order to account for the likely
lag that occurs from the time tort reform was enacted and when
its economic impact is measurable, the reform dates are lagged
using variables X 3• X 4• X5• and X 6• These variables represent
whether tort reform was enacted the previous year, two years
ago, three years ago, orfour years ago respectively. The variable
X7 represents whether or not reform was enacted in any year prior
to the year attached to this variable. The coefficients of these
variables provide for the measure of the impact of tort reform on
the change in PPL The term e is simply the error term, which in
this model is used to account for any other changes within a
state's economy that may have led to a change in PPI.
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Findings of the Study '
The chart above summarizes the results obtained by applying
the model to the data collected7• The results show that tort
reform, as defined by this study, does indeed have a slight impact
on the change in PPI after the reform is enacted. After running
a regression using the model described previously, one observes
that the coefficients of the variables representing tort reform on
a two and three year lag (X· and X ) are both positive and
4
5
statistically significant using a 95 percent confidence interval
~See _Appendix 2). The actual coefficient for X4 is 163.02. This
tmphes that tort reform is responsible for a $163.02 change in PPI
~f tort reform was enacted two years prior. The coefficient for X5
ts 204.11. This implies that tort reform is responsible for a
$204. II change in PPI if tort reform was enacted three years
prior. The coefficients for X2 , X 3 , X6 , and X 7 are all negative,
Implymg a negative impact on the change in PPI for that particular
variable. This however is rejected by the author because it does
not fall within the 95 percent confidence interval.
0

0

0

•

0

The projected benefit to Arkansas from the Civil Justice
Reform Act is an increase in the growth of PPI for 2005 and 2006
(two and three years removed from the year the reform was
enacted). The model employed in this research shows that there
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is a positive change in the growth rate in these years with little or
no effect on any prior or future year's PPI. Therefore, one may
begin to develop a time line for when tort reform begins to impact
the economy. This time line is reflected above in the Tort Reform
Benefit Cycle. Within the first two years of the reform, businesses,
insurers, healthcare providers, and ordinary citizens enter into an
adjustinent phase (1) in which insurance premiums and the cost
of doing business begins to decrease. Eventually, this decrease
is passed on to employees in the form of higher wages and to
consumers in the form oflower prices (2). This research implies
that the passing of the savings occurs in years three and four.
After this time, it is reasonable to conclude that the economy
adjusts to the original reforms made (3), and the change in PPI
is no longer impacted directly by the reforms(4).
By inserting PPI data into the model, one can calculate the
per capita dollar impact of tort reform on personal income in
Arkansas in the years 2005 and 2006. With the reforms in place,
PPI for 2005 should total $26,577.34. Without the reforms, PPI
would total $26,414.32. The total increase in PPI that can be
attributed to the tort reforms passed in 2003 is $163.02. With the
reforms in place, PPI for 2006 should total $27,833.95. Without
the reforms, PPI would total $27,463.21. The total increase in
PPI for 2006 attributable to tort reform is $370.74. After this
time, the model predicts that none of the growth in PPI can be
attributed to the tort reforms of 2003. However, although the
direct impact on personal income is diminished after 2006,
Arkansas' PPI would then grow from a higher level with the tort
reform in place versus without. Thus, the actual dollar amount
of growth and level of PPI is higher than had reform not been
enacted for the foreseeable future.

7
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Conclusion:
As one can clearly see, tort reform is a complex and
difficult issue. The sheer number of reforms and combinations
of reforms possible is, simply put, mind-boggling. One thing is
for certain: the debate as to whether or not tort reform provides
an overall net positive for society is sure to surge ahead. Some
will say that the impact on the economy and improved efficiency
in the civil justice system provides enough evidence to conclude
that tort reform should be enacted at every level. Others will say
that by limiting the amount awarded in damages or eliminating
the long standing precedence of things such as joint and several
liability or the collateral source rule does nothing but hurt the
very people the legal system is designed to protect. Above all
else, this study will hopefully prove useful in its summary of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, and its impact on Arkansas'
economy

Endnotes:
1 To read a summary of the entire case, see http://www .ican2000 .com/
statements I tort/ mcdonalds.html.
2 This publication can be found at http:/ /www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/ category /14819.html.
3 Data can be obtained from http:/ /www.bea.gov /bea/regional/
spi/ #download.
4 Data can be obtained from http://www.atra.org/states/.
5 Dr. Collins serves as Director for the Center for Business and
Economic Research at the University of Arkansas' Sam M. Walton
College of Business.
6 Dr. Deck is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of
Arkansas' Sam M. Walton College of Business.
7
Results are summarized in Appendix 1.
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Appendix 1.
Year

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

PPI with Tort Refonn

24384.00
25388.07
26577.34
27833.95
28914.19
30018.28
31146.74
32300.12
33478.97
34683.84
35915.31
37173.96 . ·
38460.41

PPI without Tort Refonn

24384.00
25388.07
26414.32
27463.21
28535.27
29630.99
30750.91
31895.55
33065.46
34261.20
35483.34
36732.46
38009.16
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Appendix 2.
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.41269447
R Square
0.17031673
Adjusted R SquarE 0.16688423
Standard Error
405.819834
1700
Observations

AN OVA
df

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Last Years PPI
Tort Reform
Reform (t-1)
Reform (t-2)
Reform (t-3)
Reform (t-4)
Prior Reform

ss

MS

7 57202085.54 8171726.51
1692 278655035.7 164689.737
1699 335857121.2
Coefficients Standard Error
465.734185 20.72956871
0.02207759 0.001445329
-66.171214 68.95168299
-34.590464 69.96783268
163.022902 70.09402596
204.112481 70.28123009
-74.685266 70.51302106
-45.996536 30.52463237

t Stat
22.467143
15.2751289
-0.9596751
-0.4943767
2.32577456
2.90422465
-1.0591699
-1.5068662

Faculty comment:
In recommending Mr. Jackson's paper for publication, his
mentor, John Norwood, made the following remarks.
I am pleased to support the publication of Scott
Jackson's paper in Inquiry. Scott's paper deals with
the subject of Tort Reform in Arkansas. It is based on
the tort reform act passed by the legislature in 2003. In
the paper Scott reviews the most common components
of tort reform legislation nationwide. He then discusses
in details" the components of the tort reform law
passed by the. Arkansas IEigislature in 2003. It is
interesting to see how the Arkansas law is similar to
those passed by other states; but is unique in a couple
·
: '
of aspects.
By far the most interesting part of Scott's paper is an
economic analysis in which he attempts to answer the
question whether or not tort reform is good for
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F
Significance F
49.61891 8 1.9201 E-64

P-va/ue
4.816E-98
1.903E-49
0.3373559
0.6211044
0.0201482
0.0037294
0.2896736
0.1320316

Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
425.0758937 506.39248 425.075894 506.392477
0.019242767 0.0249124 0.01924277 0.02491241
-201.410767
69.06834 -201.41077 69.0683401
-171.82306 102.64213 -171.82306 102.642133
25.54279455 300.50301 25.5427946 300.50301
66.26519726 341.95976 66.2651973 341.959764
-212.987177 63.616645 -212.98718 63.6166445
-105.866542
13.87347 -105.86654 13.8734699

Arkansas. Scott consulted with two economics
professors here in the Walton College and with their
help developed a model which might provide some
insight as to whether tort reform is beneficial. The
results of other states are reviewed, and Scott concludes
with a prediction of what will be the economic results
of tort reform in Arkansas.
In summary, Scott did an outstanding job on this
paper, both in terms of background research involving
an immense number of hours in the library, and
considerable effort in developing an economic model.
This was not surprising to me, as I have worked with
Scott for many years in my capacity as director of the
honors program. Scott is a superior student, and will
be graduating next week Summa Cum Laude and as
a First Ranked Senior Scholar. After graduation he
will continue his studies in iaw school.
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